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NEW YORK, (AP)—CONCERN OF SOME OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S CLOSEST ADVISERS ABOUT THE "IMMORALITY" OF MASKED AGGRESSION LED TO THE FAILURE OF THE UNITED STATES-BACKED INVASION OF CUBA LAST APRIL, SAYS FORTUNE MAGAZINE.

CHARLES V. MURPHY, THE MAGAZINE'S WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT, WRITES IN THE SEPTEMBER ISSUE THAT THE IDEA FOR THE INVASION HAD TAKEN ROOT DURING THE EARLY SUMMER OF 1960 AND THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING IT.

THEN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER PERSONALLY REVIEWED THE PLANS FROM TIME TO TIME, MURPHY WROTE, AND WHEN JOHN KENNEDY WAS ELECTED TO SUCCEED HIM HE ALSO WAS BRIEFED.

UPON TAKING OFFICE, KENNEDY WAS GIVEN THIS GENERAL PICTURE OF THE PROPOSED INVASION BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE WRITER SAID:

WITH A SMALL INVASION FORCE, SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION WOULD HINGE ON B26S CONTROLLING THE AIR OVER THE BEACHHEAD. THE PLANES WERE TO OPERATE FROM A STAGING BASE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, MORE THAN 500 MILES FROM CUBA AND WOULD HAVE ONLY 45 MINUTES FOR ACTION ON TARGET.

IN CONTRAST, CASTRO'S AIR FORCE COULD BE OVER THE BEACHHEAD AND THE INVADERS' SHIPS IN A MATTER OF MINUTES AND FOR A MUCH LONGER TIME. REDUCING HIS AIR POWER THIS WAS A NECESSITY, THE JOINT CHIEFS FELT.

AT A CABINET MEETING ON APRIL 4, THE CIA'S RICHARD M. BISSELL—THE MAN GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PLAN—GAVE A FINAL REVIEW OF THE OPERATION, MURPHY WROTE.

AT THAT TIME, HE ADDED, SEN. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, DECLARED THE U.S. SHOULDN'T GET INVOLVED AT ALL.

MURPHY SAID TWO OTHER MEN NOT PRESENT AT THE MEETING SHARED FULBRIGHT'S FEELINGS: UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE CHESTER BOWLES AND ADLAI STEVENSON, THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS.